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complete solution of the problem was given by Van den Berg. In 
a sequel published a year later, he showed that the problem of 
determining a triangle if its external bisectors are known is 
much simpler and may be reduced to the solution of a cubic equa- 
tion. Also by Bottema is a short paper on C. H. D. Buys-Ballot 
(pp. 172-1761, well known for his work as a meteorologist. Al- 
though not trained and educated as a mathematician, Buys-Ballot 
was professor of mathematics at the University of Utrecht for 
twenty years. 
Some details on the history of the so-called Korteweg-De Vries 
equation are given by F. van der Blij (pp. 54-64). Diederik 
Johannes Korteweg and his student Gustav de Vries introduced 
this nonlinear differential equation in 1895 in a paper entitled 
"On the Change of Form of Long Waves Advancing in a Rectangular 
Canal, and on a New Type of Long Stationary Waves." 
The history of the foundation of mathematics, mainly in the 
Netherlands since 1900, is treated by A. Heyting (pp. l-21). He 
deals with the work of G. Mannoury, Evert W. Beth, and especially 
L. E. J. Brouwer and his intuitionism. Mannoury and Brouwer 
also are the major actors in the paper of H. Freudenthal on the 
history of topology in the Netherlands (pp. 22-40). H. S. M. 
Coxeter retraces the study of polytopes in the Netherlands 
(pp. 116-141), giving an outline of the contributions of Pieter 
Hendrik Schoute, Johan Antony Barrau, Pieter Mulder, Salomon 
Levi van Oss, Alicia Boole Stott (one of the five daughters of 
George Boole), and Willem Abraham Wythoff. 
To conclude, we must mention the survey given by A. F. 
Monna of the history of the theory of functions, which pays 
special attention to the development in the Netherlands, and 
the paper of J. C. H. Gerretsen on H. Schuberts "Kalkiil der 
abzahlenden Geometrie" (pp. 142-1601, in which Gerretsen refers in 
particular to Van der Waerden's and his own contributions. 
This series of well-documented papers represents a somewhat 
disparate but valuable contribution to the recent history of 
mathematics, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
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The rivalry between the philosophy of science and her step- 
sister the history of science was fated to be reenacted, so it 
Copyright 0 1981 by Academic Press, Inc. 
A8 rights of reproduction in arty form reserved. 
100 Reviews HM 8 
seems, between the history and philosophy of mathematics. The 
basis of the dispute has been the claim of philosophers that the 
history of mathematics need not interest them. Of philosphical 
interest are the criteria and methods for proving theorems. How 
a particular theorem was discovered and the attempts that led to 
its improvement and ultimate rigorous formulation carry no weight 
in discussing its validity and systematic worth, which alone can 
be of philosophical interest. What is of philosophical interest 
is the logical foundations of mathematics. There is, however, no 
logic of discovery; and accordingly, there can be no true familial 
relationship between the history and philosophy of mathematics. 
Lakatos seeks to heal this rift. His aim is to show that while 
the history of mathematics without the philosophy of mathematics 
is blind, the philosophy of mathematics without the history of 
mathematics is empty. Unfortunately, Lakatos' peacemaking ef- 
forts are only partially successful. 
In Lakatos' view deductivist formalist mathematics is not 
real mathematics. The axiomatic systems of the formalist are 
the fossilized remains of a vital informal logic, which he calls 
the logic of proofs and refutations. At the basis of real mathe- 
matics are naive conjectures, and mathematics progresses in quasi- 
empirical fashion through the incessant improvement of guesses by 
speculation and criticism. Mathematics does not grow through the 
increase of theorems deduced from indubitable axioms, but rather 
through a sequence of thought experiments, attempted proofs, and 
the generation of local and global counterexamples suggective of 
lemmas which in turn provide conditions for the replacement of the 
original conjecture by a richer proof-generated concept. 
As an illustration of this method Lakatos chooses the Euler 
conjecture, the claim that all polyhedra are characterized by the 
relation V - E + F = 2, where V are vertices, E are edges, and 
F are the number of faces of a polyhedron. In rational recon- 
struction of the sequence of attempts to prove this conjecture, 
Lakatos succeeds in presenting an entire spectrum of mathematical 
strategies. In a delightful dialogue format we are introduced to 
characters espousing conventionalist, dogmatist, verificationist, 
falsificationist, and critical refutationist strategies. The 
dialogue format also provides Lakatos the opportunity of dis- 
playing the sarcasm and humor which came to be his special 
trademark. 
Some of the flavor of the method of Proofs and Refutations 
can be gathered from Lakatos' consideration of what he charac- 
terized as the first global counterexample to the Conjecture 
which was proposed by Lhuilier in a memoir of 1812-1813. It is 
a solid bounded by a pair of nested cubes, one of which is in- 
side but does not touch the other. This hollow cube falsifies 
the conjecture, for it requires that V - E + F = 4. One strategy 
for dealing with this counterexample typifies dogmatists and 
conventionalists. It is a strategy Lakatos calls monster-barring, 
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and according to it, one simply defines a polyhedron as a system 
of polygons for which V - E + F = 2 holds. By the method of mon- 
ster-barring any counterexample to the original conjecture can 
be eliminated by a clever redefinition of terms. But his strategy 
succeeds only by delimiting, restricting, and, most often, in 
contracting the domain of the original conjecture. Lakatos re- 
gards those employing this strategy as having lost touch with 
real mathematics. They have fallen in love with proving unas- 
sailable theorems rather than discovering mathematical truth. 
They have become enamored of "Eulerianness" and have forgotten 
that the original quest was for a relation that characterizes 
polyhedra as such. "What if Eulerianness is merely an accidental 
property of some polyhedra?" asks Lakatos. It may be that Eule- 
rianness is not part of the rational design of the universe. 
In moments such as these Lakatos reveals his true colors as 
a mathematical realist. In fact he appears frequently in the 
guise of a Hegelian idealist, for he writes that while mathematics 
is the product of a human activity, it "alienates itself" from 
its human source, becoming a living, growing, and autonomous 
organism with its own laws of growth. In his view there are 
mathematical truths, a collection of entities that Lakatos, like 
Popper, identifies with a Platonic "third world," and the object 
of constructing proofs and seeking to refute them is to discover 
the architecture of these third-world objects. This helps us to 
see why monster-barring is such an evil strategy. By barring 
exceptions and counterexamples in order to rescue "nice" theorems, 
the conventionalist cuts off access to the "third world." What 
he should do is follow Lakatos' own critical refutationist stra- 
tegy by attempting to use counterexamples as a means for exploring 
the domain and limits of the original conjecture. Rather than 
seeking to exclude exceptions, a methodical procedure should be 
generated for unearthing as many exceptions to the original con- 
jecture as possible. Rather than barring these exceptions as mon- 
sters through the trick of redefining what is meant by "polyhe- 
dron," "edge," "face," vertex," etc., a positive heuristic should 
be generated which seeks to improve the original conjecture by 
using the counterinstances as an opportunity to improve the 
original proof. Weak links in the proof should be shored up 
with lemmas which are then incorporated into the original proof 
as conditions, thereby establishing a real interaction between 
proof and counterexamples which leads to the growth of knowledge. 
Thus Lhuilier's hollow cube and related picture-frame polyhedra, 
both of which were counterexamples to the Euler conjecture, lead 
in Lakatos' method to a careful proof analysis clarifying the in- 
tuitive idea at the basis of original conjecture. In the example 
Lakatos explores, proof analysis turns up the need for introducing 
the notions of "simply connected faces" and of "simple polyhedra." 
These notions serve as the basis for proving two lemmas; namely, 
"For a simple polyhedron, with all its faces simply connected, 
102 Reviews HM 8 
V - E + F = 2,” and "If a polyhedron is simple then there always 
exists an order of deletion of triangles in the resulting flat 
network such that V - E + F will not alter." These two lemmas 
then result in the improved lemma-incorporating theorem: "All 
simple polyhedra with simply-connected faces are Eulerian." 
Two features of the method of proofs and refutations are 
important to bear in mind. First, it is clear that refutations 
and counterexamples are not to be taken as absolute falsifications 
of original conjecture. They are to be taken as occasions not 
for giving up the primitive insight, but for clarifying it, pos- 
sibly enriching it, and ultimately perfecting it. A falsifica- 
tionist strategy, for example, would have dictated giving up the 
Euler conjecture as soon as the nested cube and picture-frame 
counter examples had been discovered. The method of proofs and 
refutations, on the other hand, does not immediately capitulate 
before the facts; rather it attempts to explore the domain of the 
original conjecture as far as possible, clarifying the intuitive 
insight upon which it is based. The object is to learn as much 
about the nature of polyhedra as possible, and while they may 
ultimately turn out not to be Eulerian at all, the real mathe- 
matical content revealed in the course of exploring this (pos- 
sibly false) conjecture can serve as a positive empirical base 
for generating a new, more powerful conjecture. Second, Lakatos 
advocates the adoption of a different attitude toward the nature 
of a mathematical proof. There are no proofs in a strict Eu- 
clidean sense for Lakatos. There cannot be, because there are 
no indisputable axioms from which one can start. We must be 
brought to understand, writes Lakatos, that knowledge has no 
foundations. We cannot prove a conjecture. We can only improve 
it. In this attitude Lakatos sides with the views of Hardy 
Wilder, and Poly6. Like them he argues that there are no genuine 
proofs, for fallibility can never be eliminated. Proofs are only 
a testing process that we apply to suggestions of our intuition. 
Some historians may rejoice over the implication of Lakatos' 
work for the historiography of mathematics. One clear implication 
is to suggest that there are rational units of appraisal in his- 
tory. Those rational units of appraisal are research programs, 
and while Lakatos did not explicitly employ that terminology in 
this early work, all the elements of what he was later to call 
the methodology of scientific research programs are clearly vi- 
sible here. The original conjecture that characterizes work in 
a problem domain gives rise, through the logic of proofs and re- 
futations, to a sequence of successive improvements of mathema- 
tical theory ultimately approximating something like "mathematical 
truth." Accordingly, in Lakatos' view there is a logical struc- 
ture to historical developments. The historian need not take re- 
course in external factors or in individual factors of personal 
biography in considering the historical development of mathematics 
ideas: rather it is the ideas themselves that determine the course 
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of historical development. Unfortunately the path of real history 
is only in broadest outline similar to that emerging from history 
rationally reconstructed according to the method of proofs and 
refutations. As Lakatos writes: "The activity of human mathe- 
maticians as it appears in history is only a fumbling realisation 
of the wonderful dialectic of mathematical ideas. But any mathe- 
matician, if he has talent, spark, genius, communicates with, 
feels the sweep of, and obeys the dialectic of ideas" (p. 145). 
The actual history of mathematics comes about, it would seem, 
as a result of the indignity suffered by "real mathematics" when 
it is forced to contend with the irrational factors of personal 
motivation and social and institutional setting that are the 
stuff of history. Only history rationally reconstructed by the 
method of proofs and refutations is intelligible, whereas real 
history, being constantly diverted from realizing the idea guid- 
ing its development, follows an irrational zig-zag path, and it 
is accordingly relegated to the footnotes by Lakatos. 
Since real history is not the object of the method of proofs 
and refutations, of what service can it be to the historian? 
Furthermore, since the logic of proofs and refutations does not 
emerge from actual history, but is determined rather by an ahis- 
torical set of third-world objects, how can Lakatos' approach 
claim to heal the rift between the history and philosophy of 
mathematics? His answer seems to be that research programs are 
metahistorical entities which enable the historian to evaluate 
the course of actual history. They help us to sort out the "good 
guys" form the "bad guys." But then we are still left with the 
problems of actual history, and even more troubling, we are left 
with the problem of explaining how it is that real mathematics 
has in fact been advanced through the misguided efforts of such 
monster-barrers as Poincare and Hilbert. According to the logic 
of proofs and refutations, they were able to do so in spite of 
themselves. They were simply the unwitting personifications of 
a world of ideas possessing its own historical dynamic. This 
solution is unacceptable to most sensitive historians. 
In addition to Lakatos' essay "Proofs and Refutations," John 
Worrall and Elie Zahar have included three previously unpublished 
case studies in the method of proofs and refutations in the pre- 
sent volume. In order to allay the fears of readers who might-- 
justifiably it seems to me--argue that the method of proof analy- 
sis described by Lakatos may be applicable only to the study of 
polyhedra or other quasi-empirical objects where counterexamples 
are easily visualizable, Worrall and Zahar have included material 
in the main text on Poincarg's vector-algebraic proof of the Euler 
conjecture. This material was drawn from Lakatos'dissertation. 
Similar concerns have led the editors to include as Appendix 1 
Lakatos's discussion of Cauchy's proof of the theorem that the 
limit of any convergent series of continuous functions is itself 
continuous. A second appendix concerns the relation of Lakatos' 
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thesis to the teaching of mathematics. A bibliography accompanies 
the volume as well as excellent subject and name indexes. 
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The book does not give a comprehensive interpretation of the 
evolution of the theory of algebraic equations nor is this its 
purpose. In the first lines of the Preface the authors define 
the purpose of the book, which, according to them, is not in- 
tended to be just a historical text, but rather a stimulus for 
studying mathematics from a historical point of view. It is also 
primarily designed for university students and secondary school 
teachers; it does not assume more involved mathematical knowledge. 
These intentions, which leave the authors considerable free- 
dom in selecting and arranging historical examples, determine the 
structure of the work and its manner of interpretation. Apart 
from a brief explanation of some terms, anchored historically, 
the Introduction presents the interpretation of the term algebra. 
It also shows the main stages of the origin and development of 
algebra, indicating that the aspects which characterize them 
were not applied consistently in chronological order. In modern 
mathematics three stages are emphasized (pp. 11-12). From the 
beginning of the 17th century algebra developed in particular as 
"Scienza de calcolo letterale" and this concept of algebra is 
found by the authors to be especially clearly expressed in Euler's 
Introduction to Algebra of 1770 (there is no mention of Newton). 
According to the second concept, developed particularly beginning 
with the 19th century, algebra is essentially the theory of al- 
gebraic equations and is based on Galois' .ideas; the theory of 
groups and the theory of algebraic numbers became increasingly 
important. The third concept, for the beginnings of which the 
authors mention G. Boole (1847), characterizes algebra as the 
study of various algebraic structures. 
The text of the book, apart from the already mentioned In- 
troduction, consists of three chapters. The first (pp. 19-81) 
deals with the solving of algebraic equations of the first to 
fourth degree. The basis for the interpretation is suitably 
chosen historical examples of various methods and procedures 
beginning with the mathematics of ancient Egypt. The second 
chapter (pp. 83-109) uses the same method to interpret the ef- 
forts of solving equations of degrees higher than the fourth. It 
points out the great importance of Lagrange's work of 1770-1771 
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